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ABSTRACT
This paper analyses the relationships 
b e tw e e n  t r a d e - u n io n ’s fe e s , 
unemployment and m em bers’ income 
and prospects of employment and the 
implications of these relationships for 
the optimal m em bership fee with an 
em phasis on the role of membership 
level as a determ inant of the trade- 
union bargaining power.
1. INTRODUCTION
Membership fees are a key factor in workers' decision to join or 
leave trade unions. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the 
relationships between trade-union membership fees and factors 
such as unemployment and members' income and prospects of 
being employed. By focusing on the roles of the trade-union's 
bargaining power and workers' inclination to withdraw their 
membership when union's fee rises the paper demonstrates that 
the relationships between unemployment and membership fee, 
members' income and membership fee, and members' employment 
prospects and membership fee can be depicted by inverted U- 
shaped curves. These relationships can be incorporated into an 
expected utility maximisation framework to determine the 
optimal fee for a membership in a trade union. The analysis' 
building stones are presented in section 2.
They are used in section 3 to construct the paper's main 
proposition about the relationships between unemployment, 
members' income and probability of being employed and 
membership fee, which are subsequently incorporated into the 
determination of the optimal membership fee in section 4. The 
paper is concluded in section 5 with a brief summary.
2. BUILDING STONES
The analysis of the relationships between unemployment, 
members' income and employment prospects and membership fee 
employs the following definitions and assumptions:
L = the labour force;
U = the level of unemployment, U<L;
M = the number of trade-union members;
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BP = the trade-union's bargaining power; 
m = the trade union's membership fee;
|X = the membership-withdrawal coefficient — a positive 
scalar indicating workers' inclination to withdraw 
their trade-union m em bership when the 
membership-fee rises; 
p = the workers' subjective probability of being 
unemployed, 0<p<l;
W = the workers' income if employed; and 
S = the unemployment payment.
Assumption 1: workers' income rises with the trade union's 
bargaining power but in diminishing additions as formulated 
below:
W = W0 - p / B P  (1)
where (3 is a positive scalar and W0 is the income's upper bound.1
Assumption 2: Membership in a trade union enhances workers 
ability to retain jobs proportionally to the trade union's 
bargaining power:
p  = I -  aBP  (2)
where a  is a positive scalar indicating the degree of protection 
against layoff provided by the trade union for its members.
Assumption 3: The trade-union's bargaining power is proportional 
to the membership-unemployment ratio and the membership fee:
M
This specification indicates that BP can also be interpreted as the 
ratio between the trade-union's budget (mM) and the 
unemployment level. It suggests that the larger the trade-union's 
membership and budget and the lower the unemployment level 
the higher the potential strike costs for employers and hence the 
greater the trade-union bargaining power.2
Assumption 4: The demand for labour is downward sloping and 
hence a rise in workers' income increases the unemployment level 
in the following manner
U = U „ - 5 W - W )  (4)
where U0 is the unemployment level associated with W0 and 8 is a 
positive scalar.
Assumption 5: The number of trade-union members declines with 
the membership fee as described by the following equation:
M -L -\ x m .  (5)
The underlying rationale for this assumption is that the higher the 
membership fee the lower the wage differential, or more broadly 
the utility differential, between being a trade-union member and 
not being a member.3
3. MEMBERSHIP FEE, UNEMPLOYMENT, AND MEMBERS' 
INCOME AND EMPLOYMENT PROSPECTS
The above assumptions lead to the following proposition about 
the relationships between unemployment, members' income and 
employment prospects and membership fee.
Proposition 1: Up to a critical membership fee, unemployment level 
and members' income and probability o f being employed rise with the
3
trade-union membership fee. This critical membership fe e  is equal to the 
ratio o f  the labour force to twice the membership-withdrawal coefficient 
( L / 2 / 1 ) .  Beyond this critical fe e  unemployment level and members' 
income and probability o f being employed decline.
The underlying rationale for this proposition is that up to a 
membership fee of L/2|x, the trade-union's budget rises despite 
the decline in membership and more rapidly than the 
unemployment level. Consequently, the trade-union's bargaining 
power for securing employment and higher income level for 
members increases. Beyond this critical membership fee members' 
income and employment probability decline as the trade-union's 
budget and bargaining power decrease with the shrinking 
membership. Given that the demand for labour is downwardly 
sloping, the unemployment level rises initially with the 
membership fee and then declines. Interestingly, the larger the 
labour force (i.e., the membership's potential upper bound) and 
the smaller the membership-withdrawal coefficient, the higher the 
critical membership fee.
P ro o f:  Equations 1, 3, 4, and 5 imply that the relationship 
between unemployment level and membership fee can be 
displayed as
j j __________Uo________  /̂ \
l + 8p/(Lm-/ im2)
and hence the marginal effect of membership fee on the 
unemployment level is:
dU SPU0 . r 0 > < L
= --------■ ^ rr(L -2 u m )=  0 ac m ——  .
dm (B+S(3) < >2 /i
Furthermore, equations 1, 3, 5 and 6 imply that the relationship 
between members' income and membership fee can be rendered as
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w=w0~ PU0 (7)Lm-jjm2 +  6/3
and therefore
dW _ pu0
dm (Lm-jjm2 + S[3)2
Finally, equations 2, 3, 5 and 6 imply that the relationship 
between the probability of members' employment and 
membership fee can be portrayed as
4. IMPLICATIONS FOR OPTIMAL MEMBERSHIP FEE
Let us now incorporate the relationships obtained in the previous 
section into the determination of the optimal membership fee 
within an expected-utility maximisation framework. Let us 
postulate that trade-union members are risk averse and maximise 
expected utility from disposable income and that the utility 
function (u) of the representative member has the following 
concave form
Let us ignore, for sake of simplicity, the issues of income tax 
and part-time employment. In which case, workers' income after 
deduction of membership fee can be perceived as a random
(8 )
dm U0 <
u = yr , 0<Y<1. (9)
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The optimal fee for a membership in the trade union is that 
level of m which maximises the members' expected utility
subject to the income equation 7 and the employment-probability 
equation 8. This membership fee, m°, should satisfy the first- 
order condition for maximum expected utility
where is the set of the model's parameters (y,S,W0,U0, L,cc,(5,8, 
and jj.) and the explicit forms of W and p are given by equations 7 
and 8, respectively.
The complexity of the above expression implies that there is 
no closed-form solution for m° and that it is also impossible to 
assess analytically the effects of changes in the model's 
parameters on the optimal membership fee. Moreover, numerical- 
simulations' results are most likely to be very sensitive to the 
choice of the initial-parameter set. Analytically, it can only be 
argued that it is optimal that the direction of the effect of a 
change in any of the model's parameter on the optimal 
membership fee coincides with the direction of its effect on the 
marginal expected utility from membership fee as suggested by
E[ u(y)] = p ( S - m)y + (1 -  p)(W- m)7 ( 11)
dm dm
—p (m ° ,0 )y (s  -  m°Y  1
+[1 -  p(m 0,<P)]y[W(m°,&) -  -1 ]  = 0 (12)
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the following proposition.
o r -  tdm° cPE(u(y)).
Proposition 2: Sign {----- } -S ig n {— -— ------ } for any param eter
a(j) dmdty
<|>e 5>.
Proof: The total differentiation of the necessary condition for 
maximum implies
dm0 _  d2E (u (y )) /  dmd(p 
d(j) d 2E (u (y )) /  dm2
for any (j)e<I>. By virtue of the second-order condition for 
maximum the denominator of the ratio on the right-hand side of 
equation 13 is negative and hence the direction of the marginal 
effect of on m° is determined by the sign of the numerator of that 
ratio. QED
5. CONCLUSION
By incorporating the adverse effect of trade-union fees on the 
level of membership it has been demonstrated that unemployment 
level and members' income and probability of being employed rise 
initially with the trade-union's membership fee and then decline 
as the bargaining power of the trade union diminishes with the 
shrinking membership level. This property has been incorporated 
into an expected-utility-maximisation framework for determining 
the trade-union's membership fee. The complexity of the resultant 
relationship between the representative member's expected utility 
and membership fee reveals the difficulty in assessing the 
properties of the optimal membership fee analytically.
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FOOTNOTES
1. The notion of bounded labour-income is compatible with the 
assertion that the high unemployment levels associated with 
income levels that are higher than W0 lead to social unrest and, in 
turn, to the collapse of the political and economic system. For an 
elaborate analysis of wage-bargaining outcomes associated with 
various models of wage determination and systems of industrial 
relations see Creedy and McDonald (1991) and Dowrick (1993).
2. This assumption is consistent with McDonald and Suen's (1992) 
findings with Australian data that union power is negatively 
related to unemployment rate and positively related to union 
density.
3. An explicit incorporation of the wage differential and utility 
differential arguments into membership decision has been 
provided by Christie (1992) and Jones and McKenna (1994).
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